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Introduction
A core purpose of the Bank is to contribute to financial
stability.  This entails identifying, assessing and seeking to
mitigate threats to the stability of the UK financial system.
Such threats are detected, in part, through the Bank’s
surveillance and market intelligence functions.  As a
contribution to this activity, the Bank has developed a 
formal survey to gauge market participants’ views about
system-wide risks and prospects for financial stability in the
United Kingdom.
A pilot survey was conducted in July 2008 to confirm both the
value of the exercise and participants’ support for the
initiative.  A full survey was subsequently conducted by the
Bank in May 2009.  The June 2009 Financial Stability Report
summarised these results;(2) this article provides more detail.
Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey
The Systemic Risk Survey(3) has been designed to gauge market
participants’ perceptions of: 
• key sources of risk to the UK financial system and how these
have changed;
• those sources of risk that market participants would find
hardest to manage;  and
• overall risks to, and confidence about, the financial system’s
stability over the short and medium term.
The survey complements other sources of information on risks
to the system, including regular dialogue with market
participants.  It is designed to enable the Bank to compare its
view of key risks against those suggested by market
participants:  first, to ensure that the Bank is not missing risks
that are of concern to survey respondents;  and second, to
highlight risks that the Bank considers to be important but are
not cited by market participants.  The survey may also help the
Bank to decide where further analysis and research is needed
and could help the Bank to target and prioritise mitigating
actions. 
The Bank conducted the first full survey over the period 
27 April to 15 May 2009.  It was sent to a range of market
participants, including UK banks, large complex financial
institutions (LCFIs), hedge funds, asset managers and
insurance companies.  The sectoral breakdown of respondents
was broadly comparable to the pilot survey, although more
hedge funds responded in the May 2009 survey (Table A).
Overall, 61% of those invited to complete the May 2009
survey responded.  The response rate may be expected to
increase as the survey becomes more established.  The Bank
intends to conduct the survey regularly and to report the
results in future Financial Stability Reports.
Summarising the results
The survey consists of five questions and is divided into two
sections.  Section 1 aims to identify key sources of risk to the
UK financial system.  Section 2 solicits market participants’
Earlier this year, the Bank introduced a formal Systemic Risk Survey to supplement its regular
dialogue with market participants.  The survey is intended to elicit market participants’ views about
the prospects for financial stability in the United Kingdom.  This article introduces the survey and
reports the key results, following the summary published in the June 2009 Financial Stability Report.
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Table A Survey respondents, by sector
May 2009 July 2008
Number Response rate  Number Response rate
(per cent) (per cent)
LCFIs 9 69 9 56
Hedge funds 8 89 4 44
UK banks 7 70 9 69
Asset managers 5 45 4 40
Insurance companies 5 38 7 54
Total 34 61 33 54
Sources:  Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey, July 2008 and May 2009, and Bank calculations.Research and analysis Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey 227
views on the stability of the UK financial system.  A full list of
the questions is reproduced in Annex 1.
Section 1:  Key sources of risk to the UK financial
system
The first question in Section 1 asks respondents to list the five
risks that they believe would have the greatest impact on the
UK financial system, if they materialised in a plausible 
worst-case scenario.  The second question aims to identify
those risks that institutions would find most challenging to
control.
These two questions require free-format answers.  To
summarise the results, responses are grouped into broader
generic categories.  For example, responses citing economic
risks, such as high unemployment, are grouped together in a
generic economic downturn category.  These broader
categories are not intended to be comprehensive;  new groups
will be created over time if the risks identified do not fit into
the categories used in previous surveys.  
Key risks
Tables B and C report all of the risks identified in the 
May 2009 survey and in the pilot survey conducted in July
2008.  In each case the number (column A) and percentage
(column B) of respondents citing each risk is also provided.(1)
The top risks identified in the 2009 survey were:
• economic downturn (82% of respondents);
• borrower defaults (47%);
• pressures in funding markets (32%);
• tight credit conditions (26%);
• regulatory and accounting changes (26%);  and
• sovereign risk (26%).
Most of these top risks were cited by a greater proportion of
respondents than in the pilot survey (Chart 1 and Tables B 
and C).  In the case of the first two risks, this is consistent with
financial institutions’ exposure to the sharp deterioration in
macroeconomic conditions in the intervening period.(2)
Sovereign risk was cited for the first time.  This category
includes risks relating to increased government debt, potential
sovereign downgrades by credit rating agencies, and loss of
(1) Annex 2 compares these figures with an alternative measure, which assigns a weight
to risks according to how highly they were rated.  The top risks identified are broadly
the same under this measure.
(2) As discussed in the Financial Stability Report, which can be found at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2009/fsrfull0906.pdf.
Table C Key risks to the UK financial system, July 2008 survey(a)(b)
Key risks(c) Hardest risk to manage(d)




(column A (column C (column C
/33) /33) /A)
Economic downturn 20 61 14 42 70
Borrower defaults 4 12 2 6 50
Pressures in funding markets 11 33 7 21 64
Tight credit conditions 5 15 2 6 40
Regulatory and accounting 
changes 9 27 4 12 44
Sovereign risk 00000
Failure of financial institutions 29 88 14 42 48
Financial market dislocation 10 30 3 9 30
Operational risk 10 30 5 15 50
Lack of confidence in pricing, 
disclosure and ratings 6 18 3 9 50
Loss of confidence in authorities 5 15 1 3 20
Property price falls 15 45 7 21 47
Disruption to derivatives and 
insurance markets 6 18 6 18 100
Infrastructure disruption 4 12 3 9 75
Sources:  Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey, July 2008, and Bank calculations.
(a) Risks in the same order as Table B.
(b) Thirty three market participants provided the Bank with their views.  
(c) Respondents were asked to list the five risks that they believe would have the greatest impact on the UK
financial system if they were to materialise in order of potential impact.
(d) Respondents were asked for three of the risks they identified that would be most challenging to manage as a
firm.
(e) The total of this column would be 165 if all respondents had listed five risks.  Not all respondents listed five
risks so the total of this column is less than expected.
(f) The total of this column would be 99 if all respondents had listed three risks.  Not all respondents listed
three risks so the total of this column is less than expected.
Table B Key risks to the UK financial system, May 2009 survey(a)
Key risks(b) Hardest risk to manage(c)




(column A (column C (column C
/34) /34) /A)
Economic downturn 28 82 12 35 43
Borrower defaults 16 47 8 24 50
Pressures in funding markets 11 32 4 12 36
Tight credit conditions 9 26 1 3 11
Regulatory and accounting 
changes 9 26 9 26 100
Sovereign risk 9 26 2 6 22
Failure of financial institutions 8 24 5 15 63
Financial market dislocation 8 24 4 12 50
Operational risk 8 24 1 3 13
Lack of confidence in pricing, 
disclosure and ratings 7 21 4 12 57
Loss of confidence in authorities 7 21 3 9 43
Property price falls 6 18 1 3 17
Disruption to derivatives and 
insurance markets 5 15 1 3 20
Infrastructure disruption 4 12 2 6 50
Sources:  Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey, May 2009, and Bank calculations.
(a) Thirty four market participants provided the Bank with their views.  
(b) Respondents were asked to list the five risks that they believe would have the greatest impact on the UK
financial system if they were to materialise in order of potential impact.
(c) Respondents were asked for three of the risks they identified that would be most challenging to manage as a
firm.
(d) The total of this column would be 170 if all respondents had listed five risks.  Not all respondents listed five
risks so the total of this column is less than expected.
(e) The total of this column would be 102 if all respondents had listed three risks.  Not all respondents listed
three risks so the total of this column is less than expected.228 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
confidence in the ability of sovereigns to fund their guarantees
of bank assets and liabilities.
Respondents appeared to be less concerned, however, about
several other risks that had been highlighted in the pilot
survey.  In particular, far fewer respondents highlighted
property price falls and the potential failure of a financial
institution, both of which had been in the top three risks in the
pilot survey in July 2008 (Chart 1). 
The apparent decline in concerns about these risks could be a
reflection of events occurring between the two surveys.
Concerns about the stability of the financial system during the
crisis led to two waves of public sector support measures for
the banking system, one in October 2008 and another in early
2009.(1) That may have reduced the perceived likelihood of
financial institution failure.  Similarly, falls in commercial and
residential property prices may have led respondents to
believe further substantial falls were less likely. 
Hardest risks to manage
From the risks identified in the first question, participants 
were asked to identify the three that they would find most
difficult to manage.  Participants are likely to interpret this
question in one of two ways.  First, it could be interpreted in
terms of costs to an organisation (for example, the costs
associated with increased regulation).  Second, it could be
interpreted in terms of losses to an organisation (for example
the losses associated with borrower defaults or the failure of a
financial institution).  It is important to note that respondents
may see changes that impose costs on their organisation, for
example alterations to regulation, as a risk to their business,
but these changes may be designed to reduce risks to the
system as a whole.  
The risks most commonly identified as difficult to manage
were (Table B):
• economic downturn (35% of respondents);
• regulatory and accounting changes (26%);
• borrower defaults (24%);  and
• failure of financial institutions (15%).
Even where risks are cited by relatively few respondents, they
may still be of concern if they would be challenging to
manage.  So it may be informative to consider a
complementary measure that calculates the proportion of
those respondents identifying a risk who also said it would be
difficult to manage.  For example, regulatory and accounting
changes was cited as a key risk by only nine respondents, but
all nine thought it would be difficult to manage (Table B,
column E).  In contrast, economic downturn was the most
commonly cited risk, but only 43% of respondents identifying
this as a top financial stability risk thought it would be difficult
to manage. 
Under this approach, the risks that were identified as most
difficult to manage were:
• regulatory and accounting changes (100%);
• failure of financial institutions (63%);  and
• lack of confidence in pricing, disclosure and ratings (57%).
Most of these risks were thought to be hard to manage by a
higher proportion of respondents than in the pilot survey
conducted in July 2008.  By contrast, far fewer respondents
were concerned with disruption to derivatives and insurance
markets in May 2009, the risk identified as most difficult to
manage in the pilot survey.  Concerns about the manageability
of operational risk, as well as risks relating to property price
falls and tight credit conditions, were also significantly lower
than the previous year.
Section 2:  Aggregate risks to the UK financial system
Section 2 of the survey consists of three questions on the
likelihood of a high-impact event and confidence in the UK
financial system.
Probability of a high-impact event 
The first question in Section 2 asks participants to report their
view of the likelihood of a high-impact event affecting the UK
financial system over the short term and medium term.
Although the survey does not define a high-impact event, this
could be interpreted by respondents as, for example, the
failure of a large financial institution or the closure of a key
financial market.  As in the July 2008 pilot survey, around one



























Chart 1 Selected key risks to the UK financial system(a)(b)
Sources:  Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey, July 2008 and May 2009, and Bank calculations.
(a) Respondents were asked to list the five risks that they believe would have the greatest impact
on the UK financial system if they were to materialise in order of potential impact.
(b) Per cent of respondents citing risk.
(1) As discussed in the June 2009 Financial Stability Report, which can be found at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2009/fsrfull0906.pdf.Research and analysis Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey 229
reasonably likely and a third or more thought the likelihood
was high or very high in both the short and medium term
(Charts 2 and 3).
Participants were also asked to report their view on whether
the probability of a high-impact event affecting the UK
financial system in both the short and medium term had
changed over the past six months.  Chart 4 shows the
percentage of respondents who perceived an increase in the
probability of a high-impact event, less the percentage
perceiving a decrease, for both the pilot and the May 2009 full
survey.  It shows that the balance of respondents in May 2009
perceived a high-impact event to be less likely than six months
earlier.
Confidence in the financial system
Finally, survey participants were asked to report their overall
confidence in the stability of the UK financial system over the
next three years.  Chart 5 shows the percentage of
respondents who were confident, less those who were not very
confident.  The net percentage balance was weighted
according to the strength of the sentiment (see footnote (b) of
Chart 5).  Confidence was significantly lower than reported in
July 2008, with a sharp decrease in those stating that they
were very confident (from 36% to 15% of respondents), and














Chart 3 Probability of a high-impact event in the UK
financial system in the medium term(a)
Sources:  Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey, July 2008 and May 2009, and Bank calculations.
(a) Respondents were asked for the probability of a high-impact event in the UK financial system
in the medium term.  Five possible answers:  very high;  high;  medium;  low;  very low.  There












Chart 2 Probability of a high-impact event in the UK
financial system in the short term(a)
Sources:  Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey, July 2008 and May 2009, and Bank calculations.
(a) Respondents were asked for the probability of a high-impact event in the UK financial system
in the short term.  Five possible answers:  very high;  high;  medium;  low;  very low.  There
















Chart 4 Change in probability of a high-impact event in
the UK financial system over the past six months(a)
Sources:  Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey, July 2008 and May 2009, and Bank calculations.
(a) Respondents were asked how the probability of a high-impact event in the UK financial
system has changed over the last six months in the short term and in the medium term.
Three possible answers:  increased;  unchanged;  decreased.
(b) The net percentage balance is calculated as the percentage of respondents who perceived an
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Chart 5 Confidence in the stability of the UK financial
system as a whole over the next three years(a)
Sources:  Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey, July 2008 and May 2009, and Bank calculations.
(a) Respondents were asked how much confidence they have in the stability of the UK financial
system as a whole over the next three years.  Five possible answers:  complete confidence;
very confident;  fairly confident;  not very confident;  no confidence.  No responses for
complete confidence or no confidence.
(b) Net percentage balances are calculated by weighting together the responses as follows:
complete confidence (1);  very confident (0.5);  fairly confident (0);  not very confident (-0.5);
no confidence (-1).Looking at the responses to these last two questions together,
although participants judged that the probability of a 
high-impact event in the UK financial system had decreased
over the past six months, they had less confidence in the
stability of the financial system than they had in July 2008.
One interpretation is that this result reflects the timing of
events in the financial crisis.  Survey respondents were perhaps
less confident in the stability of the system in May 2009 than
in July 2008, as a result of the crisis worsening in the second
half of 2008.  But participants may have also thought that a
high-impact event was less likely in May 2009 than during the
period of instability six months earlier.  This is consistent with
the improvement in market sentiment in the second quarter 
of 2009, discussed in the June 2009 Financial Stability Report.
Conclusion
The Bank recently launched a biannual Systemic Risk Survey to
improve its understanding of market participants’ views on
system-wide risks and on prospects for financial stability.  
The May 2009 survey highlighted a number of the risks that
the Bank had also identified in its surveillance work.  Several 
of these risks were discussed in the June 2009 Financial
Stability Report.  In addition, the survey helped to reveal 
those risks that market participants believed they would 
find difficult to manage.  As future results are collected, it is 
hoped that the Systemic Risk Survey will become an
increasingly important input into the Bank’s assessment 
of systemic risk.
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Annex 1
Survey questions
Section 1:  Key sources of risk to the UK financial system
1.1 Looking ahead, which risks do you believe would have the greatest impact on the UK financial system if they were to
materialise?  Please list risks in order of potential impact (ie greatest impact first).  
Respondents are asked to list five risks.
1.2 Which of these risks would you find most challenging to manage as a firm? 
Respondents are asked to list three risks.
Section 2:  Aggregate risks to the UK financial system
2.1 In your view, what is the probability of a further high-impact event in the UK financial system in the period ahead?
In the short term?  Very high     High     Medium     Low     Very low
In the medium term?  Very high     High     Medium     Low     Very low
2.2 How has this probability changed over the last six months?
In the short term?  Increased     Unchanged     Decreased
In the medium term?  Increased     Unchanged     Decreased
2.3 How much confidence do you have in the stability of the UK financial system as a whole over the next three years?
Complete confidence     Very confident     Fairly confident     Not very confident     No confidence
Annex 2
Additional results
The results described in the main article are based on the
percentage of respondents citing certain risks.  But the survey
participants were asked to list their top five risks in order of
potential impact.  To take account of the relative importance
that individual respondents attached to each risk, it is possible
to construct a weighted average percentage for each risk.  This
measure places greater weight on those risks that tended to be
ranked more highly in each respondent’s top five.  But as 
Table A1 shows, for the May 2009 survey, the top risks are
broadly the same, whichever method is used to calculate the
results. 
Table A1 Key risks to the UK financial system(a)(b)
May 2009(c) July 2008(d)
Number of  Weighted  Number of  Weighted 
times cited average  times cited average 
percentage percentage
Economic downturn 28 23 20 15
Borrower defaults 16 14 4 3
Pressures in funding markets 11 9 11 9
Sovereign risk 9 9 0 0
Failure of financial institutions 8 7 29 28
Regulatory and accounting changes 9 6 9 4
Financial market dislocation 8 5 10 7
Loss of confidence in authorities 7 5 5 2
Tight credit conditions 9 4 5 4
Disruption to derivatives and 
insurance markets 5 4 6 5
Lack of confidence in pricing, disclosure 
and ratings 7 4 6 4
Operational risk 8 4 10 6
Property price falls 6 4 15 11
Infrastructure disruption 4 2 4 2
Sources:  Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey, July 2008 and May 2009, and Bank calculations.
(a) Respondents were asked to list the five risks that they believe would have the greatest impact on the UK
financial system in order of potential impact.
(b) Table shows a weighted average percentage.  Each risk’s rank is assigned a weight as follows:  risk 1 (5);  
risk 2 (4);  risk 3 (3);  risk 4 (2);  and risk 5 (1).  The number in the table is the weighted number of responses
for each risk as a percentage of the total.
(c) Thirty four market participants provided the Bank with their views. 
(d) Thirty three market participants provided the Bank with their views.